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DRAFT: SOIVÍE WAYS OF BEING IN PLATO, BY ALLAN SILVERMAN; SAGP, NYC/91
A proper assay o f Plato's ontology would treat of all the different kinds o f things which, according 
to Plato, are said to be. It would divide those kinds into the primitive and, if  there are any, the derived, and 
then show, where possible, how the latter kind o f beings arise from the former. In addition, it might try to 
explain why Plato stkrts horn the primitives he does, that is, why he thinks them the best arxai. Finally, 
perhaps, it would isolate and discuss any meta-principle which Plato relies on, and the very categories of 
the ontological theory, with the aim of showing how they are to be assimilated to the theory itself. What 
follows will not be a proper assay o f Plato’s ontology. I do not have the time to do a proper assay, 
although the lack Of time is only a prôphasis. Id o  not know how to complete all diese tasks. So, in 
deference to my fellow symposiast, I propose to examine on this occasion three closely related issues in the 
interpretation of Plato's metaphysics, die separation of Forms, participation, and the nature o f particulars1. 
In the compass of this talk, I cannot do justice to all three of these issues, indeed probably to none of them. 
A fortiori, I cannot do a semblance o f justice to the closely related topics o f predication, both ontological 
and linguistic; the status of Aristotle's remarks about Plato's metaphysics and his own treatment of these 
issues, or the vexing problem of the development of Plato’s thinking. Nonetheless, I cannot avoid these 
topics. So please regard the claims I stake about these matters as promissory. I hope to cash them later.
I: Remarks on the strategy.
The key to understanding Plato's metaphysics is to determine the various roles essence, ο υ σ ία , 
plays within i t  I assume that Plato’s metaphysical inquiries begin with and from the Socratic 'W hat is X' 
question. The answer to this question is a (linguistic) definition, λ ό γ ο ς , which has the form of a subject- 
predicate sentence consisting of a subject-term, the definièndum, a copula, and a predicate-expression, die 
definiens. (As a matter o f convenience, however, I shall often use 'definition* to refer just to the definiens.) 
The subject term is usually a name or noun phrase, e g . , ' Justice' or 'T he Just Itself, while the predicate- 
expression is a complex phrase. The name signifies the object whose essence we are seeking. The predicate 
signifies the essence of that Object. Thus when we know the answer to a What is X question, we know the 
essence o f X. One question we must answer is what kinds o f things possess essences, or, equivalently, 
can serve as the subject o f a definitioa G early Forms caa  It is not clear whether particulars such as 
Socrates are definable. The worry here is not whether there are Forms of natural kinds, as opposed to 
Forms restricted in population to ineomplete properties. I shall posit Forms o f natural kinds. My concern, 
rather, is whether particulars in natural kind classes are definable, or to put it differently, whether they have 
essences. A second question concerning definitions is how the essence signified by the definiens applies to 
the definable subjects. In the we find a distinction between two ways a word or a predicate may
apply to an object It may apply in virtue of what an object Has, or it may apply in virtue of what an object 
Is^. '  Beautiful' applies to Helen in virtue of the Beauty which she Has, not in virtue of what she Is. In 
those cases where there are Forms,-and at the very least there are Forms for relatives and incomplete 
notions like Beauty-, the text makes it clear that 'beautiful' applies to Beauty itself in virtue of what it Is. 
When it applies to other things, such as Helen, it does so in a secondary or derivative manner. Having 
granted that there are Forms for predicates such as 'm an', the second question can be put as follows: does 
the essence signified by a definiens apply to whatever it applies to in virtue of what that thing Is, in virtue of 
what it Has, or in virtue of either what it Is or what it Has. The final question is what are the metaphysical 
consequences of the fact that something does or does not have an essence, both with respect to the Forms 
themselves, particulars, arid their relation to orie another.
How we answer thesé questions will partially determine what we make of Plato’s account of 
particulars, of participation, and of the separation of Forms. If, for instance, we conclude that particulars 
are not definable, we can claim that Forms are definitionally separate from particulars in that the definition 
will apply only to the Form of, say, Man. If we add the thesis that possession of essence is sufficient for 
existence, we can then conclude that Forms are ontologically separate from particulars; being definable they 
are capable on their own of existing apart from particulars (and perhaps from other Forms). On the other 
hand, we may want to argue that although particulars cannot possess essences in the same manner as Forms 
do, they must have essences lest they be bare particulars. Particulars will then have essences, whereas 
Forms are essences. Among other issues raised by this possibility is the nature of the participation relation 
itself. Traditionally, at least in one tradition, participation has been equated with the relation between a 
particularand a Form, and opposed to the relation between a Form and its essence, which we can call 
'Being'. Are we then to conclude that a particular’s having an essence is due to its participation in a Form? 
The status of the participation relation and its interplay with essence leads directly to the third of our 
questions. If particulars lack essences entirely, what are they and how do they come to be what they are?
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Conversely, since it seems clear that by the time o f th eSophist Forms are not just or not simply essences, 
do Foims participate in other Forms? Moreover, if  Being itself is a Form, how are we to explain the notion 
of a Fbrm participating in Being? -
In this talk I want to defend a view of particulars according to which particulars are bundles of 
properties/Ihey are what they am by participating in Forms. They neither áre nor have essences, not even 
relationally. The properties in these bundles are not the Forms themselves, but fonn-copies or property- 
instances. I will therefore offer a metaphysical account of the nature o f these form-copies. I will also defend 
a view o f participation according to which participation turns out to be a family concept, among whose sub­
species is a primitive and sui generis relation that obtains between particulars and other entities, and between 
Forms and other Forms. In both of these cases I will argue that to participate in a Form is for the participant 
to be characterized by that Form, i.eM to have the property(-instance)which the Form Is. Furthermore, I 
want to show how Plato can claim that Forms and Forms alone participate id Being, where that a) commits 
him to the previous claim that the participating Form is characterized in a certain way; but b) fails to commit 
him to the claim that to participate in the Form Being is to treat existence ás a property, or c) to a vicious 
regress of Participations, and yet d) allows him to speak o f á special ontological relation. Being, that can be 
contrasted with Participation. I will approach these positive claims from an examination of the problem of 
Separation. M y aim here is to clarify some of the difficulties confronted by various interpretations o f what it 
is for Forms to be separate, in order to develop some of the tools I need to address the issues of 
participation and the nature o f particulars.
If we return to the Phaedo and its discussion of how names or predicates apply to objects (102al0- 
105c7), we note that the linguistic relations 'being the name o f and 'being the eponym o f appear to model 
two metaphysical relations. Being and Participating, respectively. 'Beautiful1 is the name of Beauty because 
Beauty Is beautiful, whereas it is the eponym of Helen because she participates in the Form, Beauty. Helen, 
we might say, is called derivatively by the predicate because she derives the property in virtue of which the 
predicate applies from the Form which is named by that predicate in a primary or non-derivative fashion. 
The two metaphysical relations explain the linguistic predicability o f predicates to their subjects. In order to 
approach the topics I wish to examine today, it is useful to state certain principles governing the relations of 
Being and Participating. Let me adopt, at least provisionally, both the nomenclature and some of the 
fundamental principles o f the logic of Being and Having developed by H.P. Grice and Alan Code. Of 
particular interest to me are what Code labels Formal Principles 3 and 4 and his total definitions:
FP3 If x Has y, then it is not the case that x Is y.
FP4 x Has y iff x Has something that Is y.
Taking the two notions Being and Having as primitive, Code goes on to define the following 
ontological concepts:
D l X is predicable o f y  iff either y  Is X or y Has something which Is X.
D2 X is I-predicable of y if  and only if  y Is X.
D3 X is H-predicable o f y iff y Has something that Is X.
D4 X = y iff X Is y and y Is X.
D5 X is individual iff (necessarily) for all y it is the case that (if y Is x, then x Is y)
D6 x is particular iff (necessarily) for all y it is the case that (if x is predicable of y, then (x Is y and y 
. Isx ))
D7 x is universal iff (possibly) there is a y such that (x is predicable of y and it is not the case that (x Is y 
and y Isx))3.
I set out these principles and definitions neither out of loyalty nor any commitment to their 
accuracy. Rather, I do so to exhibit the possibility that, first, we can employ à notion of I- (or essential) 
predication which does not amount to treating that notion as equivalent to identity; second, that within this 
logic we can derive an identity relation from I-predication; and, finally, because this logic bans the 
possibility that anything, x, can both Be and Have some property, y. Code, of course, is well aware that 
FP3 might be incompatible with doctrines expressed in thè Sophist He is equally aware that the logic as 
stated may not capture Plato's theory at any stage of its development, since it is designed to represent what 
Aristotle may have thought to be the metaphysical theory of Plato especially as it appears in the Phaedo. 
Code notes, for instance, that no provision is made for souls. Another omission are those mysterious 
entities, the-large-in-Socrates, the-beautiful-in-Helen, what I've labelled 'form -copies^. In the subsequent 
discussion, I ww rely on the logic of Being and Hjaving-although with challenges to these definitions and 
their im plications- both to explore the various answers to the three questions raised in our brief discussion 
of essence and to illustrate how those questions and their answers condition our conclusions about t ; 
separation, participation and the nature of particulars.
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SEPARATION
Of the many features Plato allegedly ascribes to Fomis, none has had a more distinguished legacy 
in the History of Philosophy than separability, Piatonicumversals or Forms are allegedly separate or 
transcendent, in contrast to the immanent universals or forms distinctive of Aristotelian metaphysics.There 
is no consensus today as to what Plato thought separation amounted ttA  Indeed, it has been argued that 
Plato never explicitly claims that Forms are separate, i.e. χωριστόν. If taken to the letter, this claim is 
true. But Plato does assert that Forms are χ ω ρ ίς . More importantly, he frequently describes them in terms 
that are arguably equivalent in sense to χωριστόν. Especially significant is his claim that forms are 
αυτά καθ’ αυτά ο ντα. What then is meant by the claim that Forms are separable or are αυτά καθ’ 
αυτά beings? There are two aspects to the separation claim. There is the question of the complement; from 
what is a Form separate?; and there is the issue of how it is separate. Since our concern is with the 
separation of Forms -a s  opposed to particulars--, the first question divides in two:
la) (Some) Forms are separate from particulars; or (inclusive)
lb) (Some) Forms are separate from other Forms.
The second question admits of three, possibly overlapping, answers:
2a) Forms are spatially separate; or
2b) Forms are ontologically separate,-where this amounts to the claim that they can exist 
independently of  : or
2c) Forms are definitionafiy or logically separate.
Of the six permutations, 2al a) and 2alb) are relatively non-controversial. Forms are non-spatial in the sense 
that they 'live' outside of space (and time). We can say either that spatial separation is not applicable to 
Forms, or that they are spatially separate from particulars which do occupy space. The spatial separation of 
two (non-spatial) Forms is either moot or a matter for stipulation.
The problems begin with combinations involving 2b). That forms are ontologically or existentially 
separate from particulars, 2bla), is the traditional analysis of what it is to be a Transcendent universal. The 
weakest reading of this claim would be to explicate ontological separation as amounting to nothing more 
than difference from particulars. A stronger reading would be that a Form, F, can exist independently of 
anv given particular which is F. Since neither of these two readings would be repugnant to the proponent of 
immanent universals, the favored interpretation of 2bla) is that the Form can exist independently of ah 
particulars which are (have been or will be) F: Forms can exist uninstantiated^. This interpretation is not 
free from difficulties. When we assert that Plato thinks that a Form can exist umnstantiated by particulars, 
we heed to ask what notion of particular is in play here. Some have alleged that Hato need not mean by 
'particular* entities like Socrates or Fido, but rather only sensible properties. On this reading, in place of 
'particular* in la , we should write 'sensibles', thus allowing either sensible properties to be what Forms are 
separate from, or sensible particulars. The primary motivation for this view is the presence o f a number of 
arguments in the middle period-dialogues that, it is claimed, show that Forms, such as Beauty, cannot be 
reduced to or identified with anv sensible property or properties.7 These arguments all concern the flux of 
the sensible world and seem to turn on the compresence of opposites. Given their reading of this notion, it 
is not the particulars themselves which suffer compresence, but sensible properly types such as 'being 
brightfly) colored', or 'being three feet long.' That a Form is not reducible to sensible properties does not 
suffice to show that these Forms can exist independently o f sensible properties; for, as the proponents 
admit, sensible properties may figure in die definition of the Form, even if they do not exhaust it. If they do 
occur in its definition, the Form will not be existentially independent o f sensibles.
Besides postulating sensible properties as a possibly relevant relatum, this approach to separation 
seeks not so much to show drat Forms are existentially independent from particulars, but rather to exhibit 
the reason (or a reason) why Plato thought Forms áre separate. To the extent that we are here relying on 
Aristotle's account o f Plato's reasoning, it is not stiiprising that by Aristotle's lights the argument from flux 
fails to justify separated Forms. Nor are the proponents o f separation as existential independence under any 
illusions here. The argument(s) from flux recounted by Aristotle, they contend, gets Plato only the 
conclusion that the universals required for knowledge and definition are non-sensible universals different 
from sensibles. Additional premises are needed to get to separation, in particular premises to the effect that 
these non-sensible universals are Forms, that diere are non-sensible substances, that the Forms are the non- 
sensible substances, and that rion-sénsible substances are separate. This last step is crucial. Aristotle argues 
that since whatever is separate is a particular, the fact that Forms are separate entails that they are both 
universal and particular. If I understand the argument advanced by these interpreters, while they concede
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that the flux argument guarantees that Fonns aie substances, as Plato understands that notion, it does not 
guarantee that Forms exist separately from particulars. Aristotle of course disagrees: in order to be a 
substance the candidate must satisfy the separation criterion. And since the Flux argument does not show 
that Forms are separate, it does not justify the claim that Forms are substances. Plato, on the other hand, 
thinks that the flux o f sensibles, in conjunction with 'considerations about knowledge and definition,' 
requires the existence of Foims, i.e, non-sensible substances. That these substances do not satisfy 
Aristotle's criteria, and hence do not license the conclusion that they áre separate substances, is true. Yet, 
tiiis is not worrisome according to these integrators, because Plato, unlike Aristotle, does not make
separation a defining feature o f substances, ούσίαι. 'W henever he characterizes the realm of ousia, he 
m entions-not separation but-changelessness, everlastingness, inaccessibility to sense perception, being 
basic to knowledge and definition, and the like. As we have seen, none o f these features requires 
separation.'(Fine,SEP, 70-71)
Let us leave to one side the reconstruction of Aristotle's arguments here. Instead, let us ask two 
questions, one about Plato's use o f the flux argument, the second about the notion of existential 
independence itself. How are we to understand the sense o f 'existential' in the phrase 'existential 
independence*? Perhaps it is thought to be obvious that Forms, for Pialo, exist, that the only question is 
whether their existence requires the sometime presence o f a particular which instantiates them**. I  believe 
th a t the 'problem atic* o f existence, as it has developed over th e  cen tu ries, has a t tim es 
obscured the issues involved in  the debate oyer separation  in  P lato . T hat existence is 
some prim itive and  inexplicable p roperty  o f Form s is no t I  th ink  P la to 's  view o f the
m atter" In fact, the argument from flux suggests why this is not so. The critical steps in the flux argument 
take Plato from the flux of sensibles to their unknowability and/or indefinability. Since it is assumed that 
there is knowledge and definition, and that these require universal«, this allows us to conclude that there are 
universale distinct from sensible particulars. As Fine constructs the rest of Aristotle's argument, we then 
assume that these non-sensible universale are Forms, that there are non-sensible substances, and that the 
only candidates for these non-sensible substances are the Forms. But this is to leave the notion of substance 
, ούσίαι, hanging in thin air. A more plausible account is to link the notions o f knowability and 
definability to substance-hood. Nor is this link hard to forge. For Plato, as sometimes for Aristotle, 
knowledge is knowledge Of definitions, and what definitions are, or, rather, what linguistic definitions 
signify, are essences, ούσίαι. Thus if, with Plato, we assume that there is knowledge, and that 
knowledge has an object, we can conclude that there are essences. From here, we can derive the conclusion 
that there are non-sensible substances from the assumption that whatever an essence is 'present to' is, for 
Plato, always a substance and the assumption that sensibles are notknowable or definable, that is sensibles 
lack essences. If Forms possess essences, and hence are substances, can we then argue that they are 
separate, that they exist independently of particulars? The answer seems to me to be yes. The argument will 
have two stages. In the first stage wé will contend that in virtue of possessing an essence the Form exists. 
Not only does this comport with the Greek, it gives some flesh to the otherwise bare notion o f existence that 
is under scrutiny in the separation debate. Iti support o f this claim, we can cite the intuition that in order to 
exist or be, the subject must be something. Dearly, being ari essence counts as being something. Indeed, 
tiie Platonist might urge that this dictum is too weak. In its place he might insist that for something to exist 
is for it to possess an essence. T hat x is F  is necessary and  sufficient fo r x to be. T hat is to 
say th ere  is no d ifferen t o r special notion o f existence: being som ething o r, b e tte r, Being
some essence, is all there is to the notion. The secpnd stage should then show that these ούσίαι, 
the Forms, exist independently of particulars. Having granted that Forms have essences and hence exist, all’ 
that remains is to show that their possession of an essence is not dependent upon thé existence of the 
sensible particulars. This, however, seems to fall out o f the argument from flux. Once it is granted that 
sensibles are in flux and that anything in flux is indefinable, we can conclude that the sensibles do not 
possess essences. For if  they did, they would not be indefináble. So, that the Form possesses an essence is 
not dependent upon the sensible's possession of an Essence. Perhaps it might be claimed that Forms can 
possess an essence only if  particulars do instantiate» i.e., participate in, Forms. But what could be thé 
motivation for such a Claim? The mere participation in the Form contributes nothing to the Form’s 
possession or failure to possess an essence; for participation, it appears, is not only independent from 
Being in the Phaedo, it seems to exclude Being: what participates fails to be (in respect of that in which it
particulars, because they show that Forms possess essences, that sensible particulars do .not possess
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essences, and becáuse Plato assumes that the possession of essence entails the existence of that which 
possesses the essence. ,
If  possession o f an essence is sufficient for existence, on a Platonic reading o f existence, then 
position 2blb), does a Form F  exist independently of all other Forms, amounts to the question 'C an a Form 
exist by itself, that is, if  no other Forms exist? The answer seems to me to be no. Such a Form would be 
victim to the arguments leveled against the One of the first Hypothesis of the Parmenides. A second 
question would be whether a given Form can exist if  certain other Forms do not ex ist It is hard to know 
what to say here. If we consider the megista gene to he necessary properties o f all Forms, for instance, then 
it seems reasonable to assert that were they not to ex ist no Form would exist. On the other hand, it does 
seem possible for some Forms, or better, families o f Forms, to exist apart from other Forms or families of 
Forms. Is it not possible that there be Forms o f Colors, say, but no Forms of Moral Properties? At bottom, 
I suspect that the evaluation of this position depends upon the stance we take to Plato’s teleology and, more 
germanely, the stance we take to the relation of the so-called elements of the definition of some Form to the 
Form being defined; for example, could the Form, Man, itself, exist apart from the Form Animal Itself? 
Guidance as to how to draw the lines which mark off families of Forms from one another is needed, if we 
are to maintain that the existence of certain Forms is independent of the existence of certain other Forms. 
Whatever can be said in the compass of this talk about the independence of Forms from one another is best 
left until we have discussed definitional separation, to which I now turn.
By 'definitional separation’ scholars seem to mean one of two things. On one reading of the notion, 
A is definitionally separate from B if the the definition of A does not apply to Β1^ On the other reading, A 
is definitionally separate from B only if A is definable without mention of (the definition of) B *1. On the 
former reading, we provisionally restrict the type of definable entities to the Form and the type of entities 
from which the Form is definitionally separate to particulars. Accordingly, Forms are definitionally separate 
from particulars in that the definition of the Form does not (cannot) apply to any particulars.The motivation 
behind this reading is a solid one: Forms just are their essences, or at least the essence is 1-predicable 
(essentially predicable) of the Form. Particulars, on the other hand, are whatever they are via Participation. 
Whereas Beauty Is F, Helen Has F. Nonetheless, this reading is not without difficulties. Some might wish 
to contend that Platonic particulars within the natural kind categories do have essential properties, where the 
'having of essential properties (essences)' by these particulars is understood not to differ in manner from 
'the having of essential properties (essences)’ on the part o f Forms. I do not believe that particulars hâve 
essences in this manner. Let us assume therefore that particulars never Are anything, that whatever they are, 
they are in virtue of Having. My problem is that the Form, which we concede the particular Has, and its 
essence turn out to be identical. This is true regardless of whether we adopt the Identity approach associated 
with Chemiss and Allen, Or with the Code-Grice Logic o f Izzing and Hazzing. But if  the Form and its 
essence are identical, how can the Form be predicable o f a particular and the essence fail to be predicable? 
We can try additional restrictions; for example, we might stipulate that a Form F is definitionally separate 
from a (all) particular F  just in case the essence of F is  I-predicable o f The F alone. This would allow 
particular Fs to Have the essence without offending the purport of this reading of the separation of the Form 
from the particulars1^. The trouble is, we need to make sense of the notion that an essence can be 
predicated o f something, or in the linguistic mode, that a linguistic definition can be a linguistic-predicate of 
some subject-predicate sentence, and yet not be essentially predicated of that thing. This is not the same 
problem as denying that some particular is identical with its essence. Rather, it is the problem of 
distinguishing among all the properties which are possessed in the same way-nam ely, via participation-, 
the one that is the particular's essence from the rest, which are its (merely) accidental properties.
Since our concern is with what a particular Has, it is not implausible to fry as a possible solution to 
this problem an appeal to form-copies. If we add form-copies to our considerations, we stipulate that 
particulars do not Have Forms, but rather form-copies. This frees us from the bind resulting from the 
identification of the Form with its essence. But we now require an account of the relation between the Form 
and a form-copy. Since we are using the Logic oflzzing and Hazzing, we are forced to say that the form- 
copy Is F, since Having is defined as a particular's Having something which Is F, That 'something’ is the 
form-copy. That a property-instance is the same in essence as the property o f which it is an instance is 
certainly not unintuitive1 A Besides, were the form-copy also a Haver of the Form , we would be off on a , 
regress or we would have to confront again the problem o f how something can Have an essence. If, 
therefore, à form-copy Is its essence, then the definition o f the Form will be I-predicable o f i t  Hence, a 
Form F will not be definitionally separate from its form-copies. On the other hand, unless the Form is /?;■·;. 
identical with its form-copies, we can still claim the definitional separability o f Forms from particulars. For 
particulars will Have form-copies, and form-copies will not be identical with their essences. Here the utility
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of letting identity be a function o f reciprocal I-predicaüon comes to the fore. The Form and its essence are 
identical, on the Logic o f Izzing and Hazzing, because the essence, Y, is I-predicable o f thé Form, X, and 
the Fonn, X, is I-predicable o f the essence, Y. If the fonn-cojpes are not to be identical with the Forni,-- 
and at least they should not be numerically identical, since property-instances are not identical with the 
property of which they are instances--, then we must block die reciprocal I-predicability o f foim-copy and 
essence. Since we have claimed thät the essence (Of the Fonn) is I-predicable o f the form-copy, we must 
hold that the form-copy is not I-predicable of the essence. That form-copies are hot identical with the Form 
is I think implied by Plato's depiction of them in the Phaedo and the Timaeus. They, it will be remembered, 
withdraw and perish and enter and exit the receptacle whereas the Form performs none o f these military 
maneuvers. On the other hand, unlike the particulars, which are named after the Fonns, the form-copies 
are, like the Forms themselves, named by the expressions which also name the Fonns; that is, a linguistic
predicate or ονομα applies to the Form and the foim-copy in the same manner (103b,e).This suggests that 
die essence is predicable o f both. And finally, there is the cléàr hint in the dialogue that form-copies are not 
only numerically distinct from the Form, they are also numerically distinct from one another. For the- 
beautiful-in Helen and the-beautifiil-in-Andromache are in fact different
There is more to be said about form-copies and their relation to particulars, but once again let me 
postpone that discussioa I want to turn briefly to the other reading of definitional separation, and to the 
attendant question o f whether the Forms are definirioriaily separate from one another. Those who offer the 
second account o f definitional separation, that A can be defined without mention of B, are prone to 
distinguish sensible particulars from sensible properties, (see above p. ) While this may seem to render the 
question of separation from particulars moot, it is not without textual or philosophical merit. It would be a 
special, and I think clearly tmPlatohic, property whose definition mentioned a particular, though such 
properties are possible (e.g., the property of orbiting the sun). But if  by 'definitional separation' it is meant 
that the definiens does not mention a sensible property, we are owed, first, an account of what makes one 
property 'sensible' or '  observational',-thatis an account of what Plato might have made o f these notions- 
and, second, an explanation of why Plato would find sensible properties repugnant The colors are 
definable, as the Timaeus at least suggests, as what is able to compact or dilate the visual stream in a 
particular way. It would seem therefore, that we cannot ban all sensible properties from the world of 
Forms. But why then is Red(ness) not definitionaJly separate from sensibles?
Since I am not sure how the proponents of this reading would answer these two questions, let us 
see what is involved in general in explaining the separation of a Form from another Form just in case no 
mention is made o f the other Form in the former's definition. The idea is that if something, the Form G, is 
mentioned in the definition of F, then F is not separable from G. Difficulties arise when we press the issue 
of whether F is separate from those properties mentioned in the definition of G, and the properties 
mentioned in the definitions of the other elements of the definition of F, say H and I. At the limit, we arrive 
at Speusippean wholism, the doctrine that no Form is definitionally separable from any other. We can of 
course try to lim it the exposure of one Form to another through appeal to families of Forms, perhaps along 
the lines suggested by tiie hierarchies developed through the method of collection and division. On the other 
hand, we might stick to the intuition that definitional separation amounts to the nothing more than the 
definitional distinctness of each Form. Since each Form has a unique definition, each is different from every 
other Form. Here we retreat to the former reading of definitional separation. For on this reading, the reason 
that each Form is separable is just that the definition is predicable of nothing other than itself (and its form- 
copies). Hence, the definition of a giveh Foim, F, is not predicable of any other Form. I suspect that the 
only way we can approach the topic of definitional separation o f one Form from the others, and with it the 
related question of whether Forms can exist independently from some others, is to examine whether, and in 
what sense. Forms participate or have a share o f each o therH  To that topic I now tiim.
PARTIQPATION
Ryle's Regress is an objection leveled against Plato's theory o f universels. In brief, the idea is that 
according to Plato participation is a relation between one thing, the particular, and a second thing, the Form. 
Since this relation is found in all cases of particulars possessing properties, we have, by Plato's lights* a 
many -a ll the instances of participation-over which we should posit a onfe, the Fonn Participation itself.
Let me quote Ryle: '  We have two different instances of the relation of being-an-instance-of. What is the 
relation between them and that o f which they are instances? It will have to be exemplification Number 2.
The exemplification of P  by S will be an instance of exemplification, and its being in that relation to 
exemplification will be ah instance of a second-order exemplification, and that o f a third, and so on ad 
infinitum. 15* One response to this regress is to insist that inherence or exemplification or Participation is
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not a relation, but rather is a sui generis relationship or, to put it somewhat differently, a non-relational 
tie. *6 The deliberate vagueness o f Plato's remarks about what Participation is permit one to infer that he too 
drought that the notion was sui generis. That it is sui generis does n o t, however, vitiate the force of Ryle’s 
objection. Were the many instances over which we are positing a single Form not of their own special kind, 
there would be no need for a distinctive Form. The emphasis must be put first on the fact that we are talking 
about a special relationship, inhering, instancing, or exemplifying, not on the sui generis character of the 
multiple cases of the relationship. We must beprepared to deny that we are here talking about instances of â 
relation, as that notion is traditionally understood. I think that there are three arguments available to Plato to 
justify such a denial. The first is quite general. Plato could appeal to theoretical considerations. Each theory 
has to start from some primitives, where what is primitive is revealed in the structure of the theory itself.
So, it is open to Plato to say, as he does, that Participation is I  know not what, but let it be whatever 
connects participants or subjects to their properties. Because it is both primitive or indefinable, and because 
it is not the kind of relation, e.g., larger than, over whose many instances the theory typically does posit a 
Form, there is no regress to worry about.
The other two arguments are more peculiar to Plato. One focuses on the nature of the supposed 
relation. Dyadic relations Obtain between two relata or objects*?, in  the case o f Participation between a 
particular and a Form, Plato clearly has to concede that the Form is an objects Must he concede that the 
particular is an object? It seems to me that he does n o t Participation between a particular and a form does 
not so much 'add' a property to an independently existing object, an object that would or could exist prior to 
any Participation it migjht engage in. Rather, Participation is what gives thé particular any and all of its 
properties; it somehow constitutes the particular and so Participation cannot be a relation holding between 
an object and a Form. Here it m i^it be objected that Plato, at least, is still subject to the regress. For after 
all, even if  Participation is best seen not as a relation but rather as something like 'being present at' or 
compresence, we have many instances of compresence and hence the need for a one over this many. Maybe 
so. But if so, I do not see that a vicious regress threatens.
The second argument in defence o f Plato begins (and ends) from the Sophist. O f all the dialogues 
the Sophist offers the most deliberate and detailed discussion o f the communion of Forms. Along with the 
Parmenidest it is one of the few places in which Plato analyses the sorts o f properties or Forms which 
might be called foundational to the theory. By this I mean tiro sort of properties which belong to all (o r 
almost all) Forms simply in virtue of the fact that they are Forms. Let us call these Formal properties. These 
include at least some of tiro megista gene. For the moment, let me postpone the question o f whether the 
communion relation,-that is, the partaking of Forms in one another-, is the same as the Participation 
relation obtaining between particulars and Forms. I want to focus first on the fact that Participation, or 
Partaking, or Communion, is not here said to be a Form, and the fact that among the megista gene wé do 
find Being. These two facts seem to me to reinforce the suspicion that Plato did not think, or want to have 
to maintain, that Participation is a Form such that Ryle's regress could victimize the theory. It is necessary 
to take the two together in order to derive this support. For the mere absence of Participation is telling only 
if we think that the megista gene exhaust the greatest kinds or most important Forms. But there is reason not 
to believe this. We recall the Republic, where the Good is cited as the most important and somehow the
foundation o f all Forms; in the Parmenides have Unity, a Form that seems to be partaken o f by all
Forms, itself included; and in the Symposium we find reason to think that Beauty is a Form that all Forms 
partake of, or should partake of, because all Forms are, for Plato, beautiful. So it might be argued that 
Participation, like these others, was just left Off the lis t However, the force of this counter seems to me to 
be diminished by the fact that Being is on the list. Being* after all is said and done, seems to be a Form that 
represents the ontological relation that obtains between a Form and what the Form is, namely its essence. 
Since the Phaedo at least, Being has been found in opposition to Participating: the former is the way or 
mode of being enjoyed by Forms; the latter is the way enjoyed by particulars. Even if we concede that in the 
(early) middle period, Forms do not participate, that Being excludes participating, and that in the later period 
Being no longer excludes participating, the fact remains that Being is a or the distinctive mode of being for 
Forms. But if  both Being and Participating are ways of being, what reasons might Plato have for insisting 
in the Sophist that there is a Form Being, which would, at the same time, prompt him to refrain from 
positing a Form Participating?
One possibility is that Participating is subsumed under Being. When Plato distinguishes thé two 
kinds o f beings, or two ways in which beings are said (255c 12-13), perhaps the auta kathautasense 
correlates with Being and the pros alio sense correlates with Participating. We need of course an analysis of 
these two ways o f being or being said. With that in hand we can ask whether there is some common bond 
between them. If there is some common or overarching connection, then we shall cite that as part o f our 
rational reconstruction of why there is a single Form Being. If there is not some common connection, - if ,
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that ist the two different ways o f being are assimilated only because o f some common way of speaking^--, 
then we are back at square one.
One prominent analysis^  holds that 'is ' is used in the first way in a sentence o f  the form 'X  is 
Y \ if  What is signified by 'X* is not different from Y-riess. It is used in the second way if they do 
differ.When unpacked» however, we find that the first way represents the 'is ' o f definition, namely where 
Y-ness stands for the essence of X. Here then we have a use that that relies on the special relationship 
between a thing and its essence ( and perhaps also parts of its essence). The second way o f being said to be,
within the notion o f Being* a characterizing and a definitional 'is '. However, if  we allow that Plato thinks 
some Forms are characterized by themselves, then even if  we have these two uses, this analysis in terms of 
distinct relata or same relata will not do. For example. Difference is what it is to be different-this is the first 
use. But in so far as it is different from all olher Forms, it also is characterized by itself. This is, it seems, 
a different sense of 'is ' from the first, and yet it is not the pros a lb  o r second use specified above. On this 
analysis, then, all self-characterizing statements would be classified as auta hath auta statements, even 
though they differ in sense from the 'is ’ of definition.
A second analysis focuses on the relation represented by 'is ', as opposed to the relata. It insists that 
there is only one kind of'isV  what I have called the characterizing 'is '. The difference isolated at 255 is then 
explicated in terms o f self-predication versus 'other-predication', i.e., partaking o f some Form other than 
itself. In this case, Being just is Participating. Now this works if  we are willing to view self-predication as 
it was introduced by Vlastos2^ All forms onthis account do not self-predicate, so there will be some 
Forms which will be characterized by the properties that characterize all Forms, and some which, in 
addition, will be self-characterized. One problem with this approach is that it seems not to square with the 
text. What one would expect to find is  the opposition 'some beings are said auta hath a u tà -tecm st they 
self-participate- but âfi forms are said pros a lb .^
Finally, we come to the view that Being in the Sophist is the property Existence: the auta hath auta 
way of being sáid represents existence statements, i.e. the 'is ' is complete or 1-place; the pros a lb  stands 
for predications where the 'is* is incomplete or 2-place. Here we find a reason not to posit Participating as a 
Form, whereas we do have a reason for positing Being as a Form* namely the fact that Existence ils a 
property. Here, participation is a relation obtaining between Forms, including the Form Being. Motion, for 
example, partakes of or participates in Being and thus exists. (256al) This leaves open the possibility that 
Being can be said to be auta hath auta, i.e. to participate in Being, and thereby exist, and to be said pros 
a lb , where by pros a lb  predication we mean to indicate that it participates in other Forms. Notice that this is 
a special case o f self-participation. There may be other Forms that self-participate. On the o tter hand, it 
seems clear that all Forms (and perhaps everything else) participates in Being, where Being is existence, for 
all o f them are. Notice also that as an on, Being will not serve as a predicate in a pros a//# predication.
Giyen its nature as a Form, Being when partaken of, will always be the predicate o f m  auta kath auta 
statement
I do not wish to enter into the debate over whether in the Sophist Plato isolates, or uses, or should 
be understood sometimes to be using, the 'is ' o f existence. If Being is Existence, arid if  being Said to be 
auta kath auta is meant to be an existence claim, then we still confiront two questions. One is the problem of 
the essence. It seems to drop out o f the picture on this view, for it neither goes smoothly into pros a lb  
predications nor does it seem to emerge in the analysis of Existence and partaking of Existence. It is not, in 
general, required that any subject that partakes of Existence thereby becomes or acquires an essence; 
particulars may lack essences and yet still exist Perhaps we could posit that when a Form partakes of Being 
it comes to have/be an essence. But this is just an additional stipulation. The second problem is similar: we 
seem to have left out any way to describe what I have been calling self-participation statements. When we 
say that One is, we speak of a being auta kath auta, If we insist that pros a lb  predication always introduces 
a second Form, then we find that self-participation is impossible. This last defect can I think be remedied. If 
pros alio predication is neutrally viewed as either participation simpliciter or, perhaps more plausibly, as all 
other kinds o f predication than auta kath auta, then We can plug self-participation in as one lord of pros alio 
predicatioa
It seems to me that a contrastive reading of pros ¿rife predication offers the best hope of 
understanding the difference between the two ways of being said to be and the postulation o f the Form 
Being. Die contrastive reading of pros a lb  uses of 'is ' will segregate being said to be auta kath auta from all 
other forms of predication. These o tter forms will embrace both complete and incomplete predicates and, 
more importantly I think, predication statements whose subject and predicate expression refer to the same 
property or thing, but are not auta kath auta (hereafter 'aka') statements. An aka predication will use what 
might most safely be called '  the definitional "is" ’. Typically ip the dialogues síieh stateÉen^ hávé tiie form
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F(ness) is F. These are definitional in the sense that the predicate awaits the proper unpacking, which 
should culminate in the hilly articulated definition upon the discovery or determination o f the essence o f the 
Form being defined. If to possess an essence, in the case of a Form, is for it to be or exist, then the world 
of Forms is the world of definable entities and exists simply in virtue of the fact that Forms are definable22.
These definitional stateents are to be distinguished from ordinary identity statements which, for 
Plato, will involve the subject's relation to the Form Sameness. In virtue o f partaking of Sameness each 
Form is self-identical. On the other hand, there is a Form, F, that can partake o f Sameness and thus be self- 
identical, just because F, in a 'conceptually prior* partaking2^  partakes of Being and thereby acquires or 
possess an essence. Naturally, Sameness, Difference and Being present special difficulties here. Consider 
Difference. Difference is a Form and hence Difference has an essence. When we wish to state this fact we 
would have to use 'b e ' in an aka fashion, i.e., 'D ifferent is (Is) different'. If this is correct, we find 
ourselves up against Plato's declaration at d l that Difference is always said [ to be?] pros eteron, with 
respect to something else or with respect to something different. Now we cannot escape the bind merely by 
distinguishing 'Difference' used as subject and 'is  different’ used as predicate. For in our aka stàtement we 
can legitimately have 'is  different' as predicate. By 'Different is different' we learn that The Different has a 
nature, that it Is that nature. In the injunction at dl-7  we are told that when 'difference' is predicated then the 
subject is being said to be different from something or everything else. When 'is  different* is used in the aka 
statement, let us say that it is not being different that is predicated, but what it is to be different for in effect 
we are saying that the essence is being predicated of The Form Difference. Thus, as with all other Forms, 
Difference is (Is) what it is, difference, in virtite o f its own nature. In the case o f everything else, however, 
there is little confusion when we point out that sáv. Justice, simply in virtue of its own nature is not 
different from all other Forms. Rather Justice is different from all other Forms because of its participation 
in the Different We must be careful not to think that what Justice is in virtue of its own nature contributes 
nothing to the grounding of its difference from all other Forms. In the case of every Form, each is different 
fronrevery other because of its own nature, namely because it is a natured entity and hence Is, and because 
for Plato there is the meta-principle that each Form has one nature and each nature is the nature o f exactly 
one Form. Recognition o f this contribution allows us to say that just because something is a Form, it 
partakes of Difference. Hence, simply because it is a Form, Difference not only is (Is) what it is to be 
different, but it is different, where here we are using 'is  different' in the pros eteron or pros alio sense.
When we say that the Different is different from everything else, we assert that the Different partakes of 
itself. Nehamas, who has written trenchantly on this passage2^, runs into some difficulties here; He says 
that the statement, 'the Different is different from everything else’, is not grounded in the nature of 
Difference, but 'ÇRJather, it is grounded in the fact that the Different, like everything else, partakes o f the 
different and is distinguished from other things in virtue of possessing characteristics which it does not 
share with them.’ (357) W ith the first conjunct I have no quarrel. W ith the second I do. While possessing 
the chairacteristic of going through all the Forms will distinguish Difference from most Forms, what 
characteristic distinguishes Difference from the other megista gene or at least Sameness and Being? Pace 
Nehamas' claim that the difference of Difference is not grounded in its own nature, I can think of nothing 
that distinguishes Difference from everything else except its possession of its own nature (or properties 
which are grounded in its nature).
Nehamas goes on to argue that we can understand statements of the form 'The Beautiful itself is 
other than beautiful* or 'The beautiful itself is not beautiful’ as asserting not that 'the nature of Beauty is not 
what it is, but only that Beauty possesses some other characteristic as well.’ (363) This is established 
through a consideration of the role Sameness and Difference can play as second-order properties. We can 
say o f a ball and a shirt that they are the same in virtue or respect of their sharing a property, say both of 
them are red. Sameness can range over all properties and be predicated on the basis o f two things sharing 
some property. Similarly, Difference ranges over all properties and can be predicated on the basis o f two 
titings failing ro share a property, fo the case o f Beauty, because being beautiful (or even partaking of 
beauty?) is a different property from, say, being the same as itself, we can say that Beauty is not beautiful 
and mean that it is something elsernamely thé sanie (as itself). Nehamas generalizes this treatment and 
concludes that we can say that Difference is different from Difference and grounds this in the fact that it is 
something other than different, namely, say, it is tiie same as itself. I agree. However, when he connects 
this treatment of the peculiar 'is  not’ statements, e.g., Beautiful is not beautiful’, with the grounding of the 
statement that the Different is different from everything else, he seems to be suggesting that the Different 
partakes of Difference because of some other character that it possesses. It seems that Nehamas believes that 
were it not the case that there were some other characteristic it possessed, the Different could not partake of 
 ^Difference. This is wrong, I behéve. T ^ p iffe ren t, like every Form, partikes o f Difference simply because 
it is à Form. It is true that there will be other characteristics which Difference possesses; the megista gene
DRAFT: SOME WAYS OF BEING IN PLATO, BY ALLAN SILVERMAN; SAGP, NYC/91
guarantee that each F onn is w hat it is  and, in  addition, is w hatever the m egista gene stand for. A nd this 
sam e fact renders it inconceivable that the D ifferent o r any Fonn could fail to  have these properties. B ut it is 
no t the possession o f diese properties w hich licenses o r grounds the D ifferent's partaking o f itself. These 
kinds o f facts are all dependent upon the nature o f die D ifferent Because it has a  nature, i.e. because it is a 
Form , the D ifferent has these characteristics and, m oreover, it is  ow ing to  the very nature o f  the D ifferent 
that these are distinct characteristics. By the same token, there w ill be no characteristic that the D ifferent 
possesses apart from  possessing its nature that distinguishes it from the m egista gene w h ich  lack that 
characteristic. So, it is because it is other things besides w hat it is to  be different that the D ifferent cari be 
said to  be different from  the D ifferent B ut it is  because it is w hat it is, it is because o f its nature, that it is 
these other things. And w hen we w ish to  explain why the D ifferent self-participates,--in N eham as' term s to 
ground the statem ent that it is different from everything e lse - , we can not appeal to  features that it has or 
lacks w hich distinguish it  from  everything, nor need we cite the other features, e.g., Sam eness, that it has 
because it  is a  Form . It self-partakes because it is a Form, because every Form partakes o f the D ifferent 
Now the sam é pattem  o f argumentation, m utatis mutandis, would show why the Same is the same 
and why it partakes o f die Same, and why die One is one and partakes o f the One. I  forego these 
dem onstrations in  order to return to Being. W e began this section puzzling over why there is a Form Being 
but no form Participation Itself. W e have found that it is necessary in  order to understand P lato's various 
rem arks in  this section o f the Sophist to  appeal repeatedly to die Form 's nature Or essence. W e appealed to 
essence when we explained what it is for a being to be said to  be in  the m ía  kath auta fashion, and the 
possession o f an essence was critical in  the account o f a Form 's possession o f other properties, especially 
Sameness and Difference. The notion o f being an essence is thus at least on a par w ith the notion o f being 
different from everything else and being the same as itself. Indeed, it is prior in that in  order to be the same 
as itself, each Form m ust be w hat it is, and this is ju st what it is for a Form to be. Plato, I  subm it, conceives 
o f Being as this generic property, i.e„ essencing. Each Form, when it partakes o f Being, is essenced arid, 
once essenced, can be said to be, -fu ll stop if  you lik e -, can be said to be different horn everything e lse - 
which in the case o f Forms means every other essenced th in g -, arid Can be said to be the same as itself. The
distinctions in  time. Rather they are confined to moments in the conceptual or logical dim ension There is no 
tim e when Difference is what it is to be different yet not different from all other Forms, as though it were 
waiting for diem to partake o f Being. Yet it is talk o f Being partaking in Being or Difference Partaking o f 
Being that is so difficult to wrap one's mind around. One source o f die difficulty is that there is no subject, 
i.e, no Form , prior to the Form 's partaking o f Being. A second, perhaps related, and m ore profound 
difficulty is that we are wont in some way to regard Being as a Form On a par with Red when we consider 
how it is partaken of. Everything that is red partakes o f Redness, and in partaking o f Redness comes to be 
die same thing, namely red, W e can say that everything that is partakes of Being, and then say that in 
partaking o f Being everything cOrries to be the same düng, namely existing. But this I think is not quite 
right, though I do not deny these claims. I would change die end o f the second conjunct to read 'the same 
thing, namely ageing '. For this better signals that what each becomes in partaking is its own unique nature 
or essence. W hat is common among all the Forms is that each is a thing o f this kind, an essenced thing, not 
that each possesses the same property, existence, or the same essence.
If this is coherent, then Plato has reason to postulate a Form Being. It also goes some way towards 
explaining why there is no Form Participation Itself. For the relation o f partaking is common to all 
interactions among Forms and participants. The form Difference partakes o f Being and partakes o f 
Sameness. When it does so, it is tied to its object in different ways, not because o f the relation but because 
of the nature o f the relatum, Being. When it partakes o f Being, it becomes essenced. I think that the special 
function of this Form to create or legitimize subjects for the partaking relation licenses Plato's postulation of 
a special way of being, what Plato describes as being said to be aka, partaking o f Being, or what I have 
called Ising. We can say that the Form becomes characterized by Being, where it is understood á) that it was 
not a legitimate object before this partaking, and (b) provided that we understand that being characterized by 
Being does not entail that there is some single first-bnder property everything becomes in being so 
characterized. We can then say that iri partaking o f Sameness and Difference, each o f these Forms does 
become characterized by these properties. Indeed ail Forms are so characterized because they are Forms.
(SO, too, I think that just because they are Forms, all Forms partake o f and hence are characterized by 
Beauty, Good, Motion and Rest. Hence all these Forms also self-predicate and self-participate.) There is a 
sense, however, in which Being is special in respect o f self-participation. With the other self-participating 
Forms, they each acquire their respective natures in virtue of their participation in Being, and then go on to 
acquire the characteristic property that they constitute because o f their nature. Being, too, acquires its nature 
by partaking in Being, whatever tfmt ..mlght-be. But it is hard to envisage what fimher participation in
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Being could be appropriately described as self-participating. Here perhaps we can say is that there is no 
difference with respect to Being between self-partaking and self-predicating. Or a lternate ly^ , we can 
appeal to the fact that in partaking of other Forms, each o f which is itself a being, Being self-participates.
I have argued that participation, at least among Forms, is a primitive notion wherein the subject is 
characterized by the property named by the predicate. The special exception is participation in Being, which, 
because of its foundational role, has a special cachet and merits a special way of being said. If we are 
satisfied that Being is a Form while partaking is not, then we can maintain our theory that there are two 
basic predication relations in Plato only with some adjustments. One obvious adjustment is to assert that 
while there are two predication relations in the middle period, there is only one in the later, namely 
partaking. On behalf of this assertion we might point to the elevation of Being to the status of a Form and 
Plato's recognition, apparently around the time of the Parmenides, that Forms also participate. However, if 
we consider that when Being is partaken of, that partaking creates or endows entities with essences, we 
can preserve everything we want from the Ising relation (provided that Forms alone partake o f Being). To 
participate in Being is to become an entity of a special sort and once one is such an entity, then one can enter 
into further relations with other entities of the same kind. These partaking relations will again characterize 
the Form. If this is a correa way to view the matter, then we should go on to discuss three issues left oyer 
from our discussion of predication and participation: 1) what is the relation between the Form and the 
elements of the definition; 2) what is the status of second-order properties like Being a Form, or being able 
to possess properties; and 3) what analysis can we give of particulars of the ordinary sort.
Let us begin with the fitst question. The problem is this: We seem to have a choice between the 
Scylla of Hazzing, in which casé the Horse itself partakes of, perhaps necessarily, Animality, and thus is an 
animal; or the Charybdis öf Ising, in which case The Horse Itself Is animal, and thus seems to possess two 
essences, that of Horse and that of A nim al^. We can beat various retreats here. To avoid Scylla some 
might protest that Forms are not like particulars when it comes to Having or partaking. They are abstract 
objects and abstract objects, unlike particulars are not characterized when they partake. To think that they do 
is to commit a 'level' confusion. This will not do as it stands, since Forms â££ characterized by certain 
properties, e.g. the megista gene. Indeed, there are other properties true o f Forms, for instance, etemality, 
non-spatiality, immutability, not to mention some relational properties such as being capable of being 
known or named. Whether there are Forms corresponding to all these properties is our second question. Yet 
we can now say that these are the sorts of properties that Plato finds appropriate for Forms and 
inappropriate for ordinary particulars. Nonetheless, were they predicated of particulars one would not assert 
something nonsensical, just something false. We therefore have little reason to think that in partaking Forms 
do not become characterized simply because they are Forms or abstraa objects. They are characterized by 
the properties that are appropriate to them (and necessarily so).
A second tack is to insist that the relation of predication obtaining between a particular and a Form 
is a different relation from that which obtains between a Form and another Form. The genera-species 
hierarchies of collection and division exhibit Plato's penchant for classifying Forms as related to one 
another in some way, but he nowhere considers Forms to be characterized by the predicates which appear 
above them in the hierarchies. So merely two predication relations will not do for the later Plato, if  we some 
kind o f predication relation holds between the genera, species and differentiae of a classificatory scheme. 
Now I think this is true as far as it goes, but I am not sure where it does go. The fact remains that some of 
the relations between Forms concern properties that Forms do have, i.e. are charaaerized by, to w it the 
above mentioned megista gene and the properties peculiar to Forms. As for the relations between the 
'nodes' o f the classificatory schema, I believe that the they amount to nothing more than relation o f the 
elements o f the definition to the Form defined. If they do not, then we can say that this tack amounts to 
insisting that there is some third relation special to this problem, some third relation which in general is not 
specified in the dialogues.
Perhaps we are mislead in asking how the elements o f the definition are related to the definiendum 
by the syntactic complexity o f the lingmstic definition. Certainly Aristotle and, I think, Plato maintain that 
the ontological correlate of this complex formula is itself not complex, but singular or unified. The 
complexity of the linguistic formula, in combination with A ristotle's'solution'of the problem through 
appeal to genus and specific differentia, form and matter, and actuality and potentiality, have, I believe, 
caused us to try to force Plato into a Procrustean bed. Though the Platonic divisions have a form resembling 
that o f a genus-species hierarchy, there is no hint in the dialogues that the genus is somehow ontologically 
prior to the species, o r vice-versa. With respect to their essences, each Form is equally freestanding and 
independent Coupled with this lack of ontological discrimination, however, is a methodological or heuristic 
priority accorded the genus in Plato's method of division^. But this amounts to the claim that the divisions
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themselves, i.e., the results o f Platonic diaresis, should not be accorded existential force: they do pot 
portray or represent the relational arrangements of the ideas, such that one idea is ontologically prior or 
posterior to another, or that one is a whole of which the others are parts. To view the diareseis in tins 
fashion is to mistake the method utilized by the later Plato to aid with the discovery of the unified ànd 
unitary Form for an analysis of the metaphysical nature of that Fonn. If we focus on the unitary nature of 
the Forms and the fact that diaresis provides us only with an analytical program, not an existential map, we 
have little reason to think that the Forms either Have or Are the elements of their definitions^. So, my 
conclusion is that diere is no partaking between and hence no problem with the relation of a Form to the 
elements of its definition. That said, it does not follow that the relation between Forms and the relation 
between particulars and Forms are different. Sometimes Forms do partake of other Forms, and when they 
do, they are characterized by the property constituted by the Form of which they partake. What does follo w 
is that we need to view on a different plane the relation between Forms that is investigated through the 
method of diaresis. The relations are roughly those of compatibility, incompatibility and implication. These, 
are elements within logical or epistemological categories, not ontological features of the world ofFopns.
The mention of compatibility and implication brings me to the second question about properties or 
notions which, although apparently subject to some kind of one-over-many argument, do not seem to have 
Forms correlated with them. It is widely agreed now that there is no solid evidence that Plato accepted what 
might be called a semantic one-over many principle such that there is a Form corresponding to every 
predicate in the language. There are a variety of ways to discount the Republic's apparent argument to this 
effect, and there is die explicit testimony of the Statesman that not all cuts get you kinds. But this said, there 
remain a host o f notions, such as participation, which seem to be sufficiently well entrenched in Plato's 
theories and /or remarks about what there is, that some have tried to use these notions either to craft 
objections to Plato's theory or to salvage certain elements of them. We have seen how Ryle employs a one- 
over many argument to create a regress of participations. Other problematic notions for Plato include that of 
Form itself. Clearly there are many Forms and hence shouldn't there be a Form, Formhood iteelf, in virtue 
o f which each o f the Forms is a Form? Similarly, there will or should be the Particular Itself, the Soul itself, 
and so on for every kind o f thing or category one finds in Plato's final metaphysics. O f the properties used ; 
to buttress a Platonic argument the most often mentioned are being extended, persistence, being spatio- 
temporal, and being able to possess properties. These are pressed into service to ground the independence 
of particulars and thereby provide for particulars that are something, though what they are does not require 
their sharing in F o rm s t With such properties in hand, scholars have gone on to build reconstructions of 
Platonic particulars which allow them to partake of Forms without being either bare particulars or merely 
relational entities. Naturally, these same properties for which there are no Forms are useful in constructing 
"Platonic solutions' to the problems of change, persistence and essential predication. For instance, the 
receptacle is said by Plato to have no properties for which there are Forms, so that it not interfere with the 
incoming images. Yet it is said to have a nature (phusis) (e.g.,Twi. 49a4-5,50b5ff., especially 51a4-b4), 
namely fie  property o f receiving or mirroring properties. Since there is no Form of this property, it follows, 
according to this line o f reasoning, that at least one thing that is not a Form (or form-copy) can have a nature 
without having it in virtue o f partaking of a Form.
There is talk o f the receptacle having a nature, as well as being invisible-and without shape or form .
Yet, it is unclear to me that this particular use of φ ΰ σ ίς  permits one to claim that it is essentially all 
receiving, or is constituted by this property for which there is no Form. The relation between the Receptacle 
and this property, beingall receiving, does not seem to be that of Partaking or Being, i.e., the ways o f 
being appropriate to particulars and Forms respectively. Nowhere does Plato talk o f fie  ousia of the 
receptacle, nor does he ever speak o f it as partaking except "somehow of the intelligible in a most strange 
way’ (5 lb l).30  Finally, attempts to define the receptacle at all or to assert that it is essentially or  is -
constituted bv any property or quasi-property strike me as inconcirmitous with the tex t Not Only does 
Timaeus insist that the receptacle is somehow a participant in a most perplexing way o f the intelligible, that 
it is hard to grasp and grasped by some kind o f bastard reasoning, but Plato's usually lucid prose becomes 
almost tortured in his depictions o f the receptacle. I think that his prose deliberately reflects the status o f the 
receptacle. It is a posit o f reason, something required in and by his best theoretical account o f the 
phenomena to be saved. It is not something that is to be defined within that account There are very difficult 
questions here about how we shouldregardthe categories utilized in his theorizing and his attitude towards 
them, questions about the nature or fur^tion or status o f what yremight call transcendental notions, or what 
we might consider a problem appropriately handledhy meta-theory or ín the meta-language. Whatever we 
make o f the status Of fie  very categories.used in  Our theory or Our account o f his theory, it seènis tO me to 
be inappropriate to offer a second-order or transcendent^ notion ästhe essence or nature o f a first-order 
entity, such as tiré receptacle. Be this as it may, the fact that Plato is so reticent to express himself about the
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nature or essence of the receptacle suggests not that he thinks it has some essence or nature o f the sort 
envisaged by these scholars, but rather that it has a different status, a status which renders talk o f whether 
this or that is its essence inappropriate.
There are other properties or propeity-like entities to which appealhas been made to account for 
Platonic particulars, especially notions like being extended, being spatio-temporal and persisting. These, I 
think, fail to live up to their billings, which I shall attempt to show momentarily. But, along with 'being a 
particular' or 'being a universal', I think they ,too, are categories of the theory, notions which logically 
prefigure any account o f what there is of the sort that Plato has undertaken. They may be part of the proper 
study o f Metaphysics. But, it seems clear that Plato does not assert (or want to assert) that his primitive 
kinds o f onta, as that notion figures in his accounts, are themselves to be explained or constituted by 
second-order properties or categorical notions such as the property o f being a Form, or being a particular, 
or being capable of receiving properties.
PART ΠΙ: PARTICULARS
Finally, we come to particulars and predication. As I've indicated, the use o f Non-Form properties 
has been key to some accounts of particulars in Plato, whether to explain the phusis o f the receptacle or to 
allow us to sneak about independent particulars which can stand in relations to Forms. For the purposes of 
this talk, I will assume that a bare particular is one that lacks any essential properties, not one that lacks any 
properties at all^l. The debate I am interested in concerns whether or not Plato allows that particulars are a) 
relational entities, and b) whether this entails that they (can) have no essential properties. It has been argued 
that Plato does allow for particulars with relational essential properties. Fine has put the case best^2. 
According to her, Matthews and Cohen (M/C) 33 are wrong to thinkthat if  some particular, x, is essentially 
F, then it is F not in virtue of its relation to F. A particular for Fine’s Plato turns out to be a 'roughly 
independently identifiable spatio-temporal continuant’ (p.248) which has (an) essential property by standing 
in a relation to some Form. Against M/C, Fine argues that there is nothing incoherent in the notion o f a 
relational essential property. She cites in defense of relational essential properties Kripke’s argument that I 
am essentially related to my parents. Other properties, e.g., being minted at the appropriate facility, say the 
Philadelphia mint, come to mind for the dime in my pocket^4. As for her claim that there are relational 
essential properties, I concede Fine's point. But I am not convinced that she has squarely answered the 
argument of M/C. For M/C, the critical principle is:
P) For x to be able to bear any relation R to something else y, x must be something in its
own right, independently of its bearing R to y. (p.633)
My worry is whether Fine has confused being something essential relatiönally with being something in its 
own right Fine has to show not that relational essential properties make sense, but rather that something, x, 
can be essentially something relatiönally without being something in its own right prior to or independently 
of its being essentially related to y. Consider the dime in my pocket It is, 1 grant, essentially what it is, a 
dime, in virtue of a relational property, since in order to be a dime it must have been minted in Philadelphia. 
Yet, although it was not a dime prior to being minted, there was the metal or matter that acquired the 
property of being a dime when it was minted. Moreover, we can independently identify the metal in its own 
right. That is, while the dime came into being only when it acquired its relational essential property, the 
metal did n o t Indeed, here we have a 'roughly identifiable spatiotemporal continuant' that becomes 
essentially something. The samé is, I think, true of me; I am essentially related to my parents, although the 
m atter-the pun is very much intended-, is more difficult to decide. In general, it seems to me that the 
question is whether we have in Plato a doctrine o f particulars such that something which exists prior to any 
relation it might stand in becomes essentially F by being related to The F Itself, or whether we have the 
view that there is no particular prior to its relation tö F orm s^. I tiö not deny the possibility that Socrates 
becorues a man by becoming essentially related to, i.e. participating in, the Form Mari! I am urging, 
however, that such a possibility is itself founded on there being something that comes to be Socrates upon 
engaging in this relation, aqd that that thing, whatever it is, might not have become Socrates, and it might 
cease to be Socrates. The availability of matter in post-Cartesian philosophy affords us the vehicle for 
identifying what it is that becomes a dime, or becomes me. The unavailability of m atter or at least an 
appropriate analogue,would therefore preclude this option in a pre-Cartesian philosophy.I believe that; ? 
there is no matter at ail in Plato that could serve in this way as the something which becomes Socrates. And 
because I think there is no matter that can become, say, a particular man by dint of its 'essential relation' to 
Man, I will argue that Socrates is not essentially related to Man, though he is related to Man. I will contend, 
therefore, that Platonic particulars are bare particulars; They have all their properties via participation, they
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have no essential properties in any way, and they aie nothing besides or before partaking in some
Foim(s)36.
There are at least three ways to ground particulars as capable o f being something prior to their 
participation in Forms. The first alternative looks to die Phaedo 's distinction between what Simmias is in 
his own right and what he is  in virtue of his relation to Largeness (102b8-c4). I do not wish to debate this 
controversial passage, since the Greek does not decide how we are to understand the notion 'w hat he is in 
hisOwn right*. Suffice it to say that if  Plato at one time thought that particulars should be treated as 
essentially something in their own right apart from participating in some property, he appears to have 
rethought this view by the time o f the Timaeus. This dialogue provides the evidence for the other 
aforementioned ways. Here scholars have found matter or something which can serve as the particular 
independent of and prior to its partaking in Forms; for instance, something which partakes o f properties, 
such as being extended, for which there are no Forms. Having already discussed why I find the theoretical 
presuppositions behind such views questionable, let me now address the textual evidence furnished by the 
Timaeus. What evidence is there that particulars o f any kind exist prior to their participation in Forms? Since 
we are looking for particulars» I ignore the receptacle^7. My question concerns the textual support for the 
view that either discrete particulars o f some kind, e.g;, fire atoms or water atoms, or matter are available in 
the Timaeus to stand in as a relatum in the participation relatioa
Two passages have been adduced in support o f the notion that some particular-like entities predate 
the intrusion of Forms into the receptacle. The first is the so-called much-misread passage (49c7-50e4). The 
second is the description o f the precosmos at 52d2-53b5. In the former, some of those who would find 
matter or primitive particulars of some kind argue that the moral o f the much-misread passage is that there 
are samples of the traditional elements. However, because they are 'im pure’, i.e., mixed with the other 
elements, when we point at such á sample and call it 'fire* we should not be mislead into thinking that we 
have identified what fire is. Rather, since all sensible fire samples are impure, we must say not 'that is fire’ 
but 'that sort o f thing is fire’, so as to avoid the implication that there are pure samples o f Fire in the 
sensible world^S. Another tack is taken by those who would argue that there is some kind of primitive 
matter, or some principle, that is permanent and stable and, because it is a constituent o f the sensible or 
phenomenal bits of fire or water, confers upon them sufficient stability and permanence that our words can 
hook on or refer to the phenomena^. Finally, there is the line o f inteipretation that saves the phenomena 
by arguing that Plato here wants us to reconstrue or to change the construal o f our statements, fiom 
identifying statements to attributive statements, all the while maintaining that the nature o f the phenomena 
does not change when we do so^O. The assumption common to all three positions is that sensible fire and 
the other sensible elements are not reducible to or eliminable in favor of the receptacle. They all want to 
deny that 'sensible fire does not really exist’, a view they associate with Chemiss. The second passage 
(52d2-53c3) is far too controversial to address adequately in this section of the paper. Suffice it to say that
the traces, ίχνη (53b2), present in the primordial or precosmic chaos are thought to support the claim that 
there is something that can serve as the relatum on the left side o f the participation relation, or which can 
possess extension or some other property for which there are no Forms. These traces, by participating in 
Fonns, become sensible particulars of ti¿  traditional sort
As for the notion that there is matter in the Timaeus, perhaps it is sufficient to note that the term
ΰ λ η  occurs only once (69a6) and carries the non-technical sense of wood or woody stuff, not the technical 
sense introduced by Aristotle. Of course, this is not what the believers stake their claim on. They would 
insist rather that unless we introduce matter, or ultimate material simples, or some kind o f material principle,
we can not make sense of the two passages discussed above. Instead of 'matter*, υ λ η , the term that carries
the sense o f 'm atter1 is σ ώ μ α , or 'body'. The connection between body, matter, and extension is surely 
close, and to this extent the idea of grounding thé independence of particulars o r sensibles in the primitive 
status o f extended bodies is not unattractive. Sensibles are then viewed as bodies occupying (a place in) 
space, and the receptacle is accordingly viewed as introduced into the discussion in order to provide a place 
or space for the primitive, ineliminable ivv/n^ia of the traditional elements. It is the swmata that stand in the 
participation relation to the Forms or to qúasi^propérties, and they are located in the receptacle. To the
objection that this is just to ignoreafiof P lattfstalkof μιμήματα or form-copies o f Forms entering and 
exiting the receptacle, perhaps the reply would be that this is just metaphor, whose cash value is just that 
thesé bodies have or acquire properties)'and that Foims are responsible for the properties in some hard to 
explainuway. ";''v .u'-'v
To the extent that proponents of the view that sensibles are irreducible or ineliminable take issue 
with Chemiss’ interpretation4 * o f the much-misread passage and the Timaeus in general, I cannot
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, specifically address diere counter-arguments. The thrust of the criticism is encapsulated in the claim that 
R em iss introduces a fourth primitive into the Timaeus. It seems to me a curiosity that one would fault a 
position for trying to eliminate something or reduce something to something else by claiming that the 
position adds an additional primitive. It suggests that some aspect of the argument was unclear or perhaps 
missed by the critics. Such is the case, I believe. Since I am not interested so much in die details of 
Chemiss' papers, or those of his critics, let me call the view I will defend the reconstructionalist position. 
The key claim of this position is that body, swma, is not a primitive in Plato's ontology; or equivalently, 
that matter is not a primitive notion for Plato. Along with this claim, the reconstructionalist also takes issue 
With the notion that the receptacle is introduced as a third primitive merely added to Forms and sensibles in 
order to provide for place or space. We maintain rather that the receptacle is introduced as the first element 
in a new non-reductive analysis of the phenomena. In support of this reading of the role of the receptacle, 
Consider the criticism of the previous cosmologists (48b3-c2). They had gone wrong in thinking that the 
four traditional elements were either atoms or molecules, letters or syllables. According to the 
reconstructionalist, to allow the phenomena to be (or remain) uninfluenced in their internal make-up by the 
receptacle is to allot them the same status as had the earlier cosmologists and as had Timaeus himself in his 
. first account What then are the phenomena according to the reconstructionalist? They are compounds of the 
* réceptacle and Form-copies. Here of course is where the charge o f a new fourth primitive seems to have 
bite: for are not the form-copies a new fourth primitive where only three are available? The answer of course 
is yes: they are new to the account and are viewed by Timaeus as something like a primitive, but no, they do 
not constitute a fourth primitive. Rather, they along with the receptacle replace the phenomena on the list of 
primitives, so one still is left with only three.
If we reconstructionalists can defend ourselves against the charge of ontological inflation in this 
manner, are we not guilty of reducing or eliminating the sensibles? l  am not sure what reduction or 
elimination amounts to in the hands of these critics; but I do not believe a reconstructionalist eliminates the 
phenomena or the sensibles, and I certainly do not think we must or do reduce thém to something in any 
objectionable sense. Perhaps the best way to approach this topic is to refocus attention on the status of body 
in the Timaeus. And perhaps the best way to do that is to consider what will strike many as the difference in 
respect of status between Timaeus' traditional elements and the elements o f the preVióus cosmologists, 
those which enjoyed the status of atom or molecule. What Timaeus does o f course is to geometrize the
elements. Fire is not a στοιχείο v  or a συλλαβή because it is a construction o f many different 
triangles. It is a pyramid, whose faces are 4 in number, each of which itself is composed of 6 half- 
equilateral elements. The geometrization of the elements takes us to the heart o f the controversy. Those 
who would have the receptacle be the basic particular concede that one must somehow divide the 
homogeneous space of the receptacle irttq places. Similarly, those who would have body be a primitive in 
Plato must admit that the best account of these bodies views them not as the bodies of the elements as such, 
but as the shaped matter posited in the geometrical account However, the geometrical bodies of shapes, the 
allegedly basic elements o f the traditional elements, are themselves not unanalvzable. Timaeus; when he 
begins his geometrical account, states clearly that "it is obvious to anyone that fire, earth, air, and water, are 
bodies; and all body has depth. Depth, moreover, must be bounded by surface." (53c4-7) The critical
elements in this account are depth (β ά θ ο ς )  and being bounded by surface, not body as such. It is the 
function of the Geometrical forms to account for the bounding of surfaces to provide for depth and thereby 
make available to the natural philosopher the elementary bodies which he can use to construct the traditional 
~ elements. That these are the ftmdamental notions is further indicated by Timaeus' concession that perhaps 
the two kinds o f triangles he will use are not necessary, that is, that perhaps one can build the bodies of the 
four elements and, hence, everything else from other geometrical figures^.
If all body must have depth and depth must be bounded by surface, what is bounded? The answer
is the receptacle in its role as space or χώ ρ α . The bounding of space creates both place, TÓÍTOS, and 
geometrically shaped figures with depth, The different geometrical Forms provide what heretofore in the 
Timaeus was merely assumed, namely the vehicle to bound space. So the analysis of body into Receptacle 
and geometrical Forms is a new feature o f the account begun at 48e2. That these geometrical Forms provide 
for the bounding of space also explains how the homogeneous receptacle comes to have or be places, for 
the bounded areas will be discrete and distinct from one another. But these geometrical Forms only tell half 
the story o f the nature o f sensible particulars. For while they provide for the quantitative dimensions o f the 
párticuíars,--and I might add thereby show that there is no need to appeal to a Form-less property like being 
¿^tended--, they do not account for the qualitative features o f the sensible particulars. These features, e.g., 
being fiefv. Or being watery, are instead assigned by Timaeus to ihe traditional Forms, Fire itself. Water 
itself, etc^k. Instances o f these Forms, as well as instances of the geometrical· Forms,fentgr and exit the
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receptacle. In thé M l analysis o f a sensible particular appeal will be made therefore to both kinds o f Forms, 
the geometrical and the traditional. The two accounts; which I will call the Formal and the Geometrical, turn 
out to be complementary. The geometrical Forms provide for the {daces where the various form-copies of 
the traditional Forms enter and exit the receptacle. The form-copies o f the traditional Forms, on the other 
hand, provide for the qualitative or phenomenal features o f the particular instances of fire, water, air and 
earth. Thus the foil analysis o f a phenomenal instance o f fire, or a sensible fire (instance), will mention both 
types o f Forms, or better, form-copies of both tÿpès o f Forms, and the receptacle.
Does this account o f sensible particulars eliminate them from the ontology or reduce them to the 
receptacle or anything(s) else? No. It does not eliminate them; Plato feels no compunction about talking in 
terms o f sensibles and particulars. Nor do I think we reconstructionalists have reduced sensible particulars 
to anything else. I have certainly offered an analysis of sensible particulars in terms of form-copies and the 
receptacle. However, I have not argued that a particular is reducible to the receptacle and the Forms. I do 
not believe that Plato tried, or that one can, reduce particulars to Universale or properties, even bundles o f 
them. Plato does not try to reduce or account for the particularity of the particulars. On the contrary, he 
accepts particularity as à primitive notion. But instead of granting primacy or primitiveness to particular bits 
of matter or particulars äs they are traditionally conceived, he.·, spatio-temporal continuants or the primary 
substances of the Categories , he accords it to the form-copy or property-instance o f Forms. They provide 
for the partitioning o f foe receptacle and the particularity of the sensible particulars. O f course, foevarieties 
o f reduction so often discussed in modem articles and books is not to be found in Plato. The only potential 
reduction, it seems fo me, is a reduction of foe traditional Forms, e.g.. Fire itself or M an itself, to 
geometrical Form s'^. As for foe sensible particulars themselves, what they are is a nothing less than, but 
also nothing mote than, a collection o f form-copies o f the traditional forms, including form-copies of Man 
and other 'highly complex' Forms, in a field defined by the form-copies of foe geometrical Forms. 
Naturally, the more complex the particular, the more complex will be both foe form-copies present to the 
field and foe number and combination o f triangles composing that particular. The persistence of particulars 
will then be explained both through appeal to foe persistence of certain geometrical shapes and foe 
coincidental conjunction of the appropriate form-copies for foe 'sam e length o f time'. One can, I believe, 
sophisticate the account so that it is not merely coincidental that the form-copy, say, of Bipedality 
accompanies foe form-copy of Man, by developing an account o f necessary Having based on foe 
implication relations obtaining between Forms.
The intuitive problem with this story is that it makes it seem all too convenient that foe right form- 
copies should be matched up with the right geometrical shapes so that the phenomenal properties and the 
material aspects or properties of man are co-instantiated in the same place or contiguous places for the same 
length of time. One cannot dispel entirely the air of ad-hocness here. But nor should one have to. The fact 
that the appropriate shapes have the appropriate causal properties is not simply a function of geometry. 
Considered from foe demiurgic point of view, the shapes are chosen and put together in the appropriate way 
because the demiurge knows foe Form, Fire itself, and thus knows what characteristics the triangular 
elements must produce in foe sensible fire molecules.
The account presented in foe Timaeas, if  I am right, yields particulars that are nothing but bundles 
o f Form-copies. Because they are bundles of Form-copies or property-instances, some traditional 
objections to bundle particulars are obviated. Because they are property-instances, more than one form-copy 
can occupy foe same place at the same time. Because no two instances are identical, nothing could share all 
foe properties of anything else-they cannot even share one-alfootigh two particulars could be indiscernible 
in that they each have foe same properties, i.e., because they each have property-instances of foe same 
traditional Forms. Any given particular would be a collection o f form-copies of the traditional Forms 
residing in or located in a particular region o f the reoptacle.A  region would be demarcated by the form- 
copies o f foe appropriate geometrical Forms, which constitute foe (outer edges of the) body of the 
particular. Participation by foe particular in a Form thus amounts to foe addition of a form-copy to foe 
collection o f form-copies that comprise foe particular. Strictly speaking, the addition or loss o f a form-copy 
amounts to the coming-into being of a new particular and the destraction of foe old one. Plato might 
justifiably consider this state to be one of flux. B u tld o  not believe that Plato regards all foe properties of a 
particular as on a par. By foe later dialogues, if  not before, he realized that Forms come in families and that 
some Forms implicate others. Hence some particulars will lose and gain some properties in groups. 
Moreover, once he has satisfactorily constructed the bodies of particulars from geometrical shapes, foe 
persistence o f certain configurations will allow him to fix certain properties as stable and persisting and 
others as more transient Finally, if he can work out an account of how soul infuses, or invades these 
regions o f foe receptacle where there are bodies of foe requisite soit, he can gain added stability for some 
particulars. v®;··. . . C ‘\'
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Yet, no particular configuration o f triangles nor any collection of properties will remain totally 
frozen. The impermanence o f these constituents of the particular are one reason behind Plato's denial o f 
essential properties to th em ^. This picture will not delight those enamored of Aristotle's hylomorphic 
compounds. But Plato is not attracted to his student's views on the matter. The implication relation holding 
between Forms allows him to claim that there are what we might call conditional necessities true of 
particulars; for example, the claim that as long as Socrates is a man he is rational, or necessarily rational, or 
that as long as this water is snow it is cold. But it is not metaphysically necessary that Socrates be a man, or 
that this water be snow. The flux of particulars is grounded in this absence o f necessity, this transience of 
properties, and finally in the characterlessness o f the receptacle, which is die foundation for all the material 
aspects of a particular, Looked at from the other direction, fire flux of particulars is due to their dependence, 
on Forms for all fiieir properties. Here flux just is the lack o f independence that distinguishes Platonic 
particulars from Aristotelian particulars. In oné sense of Necessity, Plato thinks that particulars are totally 
contingent creatures. It is not necessary that die demiurge construct the world, or that Form-copies 
congregate in the appropriate fashion. However, this is to take too dim a view o f the creation myth. Given 
the nature o f the Demiurge, o r if, like me, you view the creation as mythical, given the nature of the 
receptadle and the Forms, particidars are die inevitable result of  the natures of these two primitive elements 
o f the Ontology. Forms beget from-copies and the form-copies in conjunction with the receptacle produce 
particulars. Essence remains locked in the Forms and in their immediate offspring, inaccessible to, though 
strived after, by sensible particulars.
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t a .  RJE. Allen» 'Participation and Predication in Plato's Middle Dialogues,’ reprinted in Studies in Plato's 
Metaphysics, (Uwidon, 1965) pp. 43-60.
2The source of my talk of 'Ising' and'Hasing' is A. Code's, 'Essence and Accident,’ in R. Grandy and R. Warner 
eds., Philosophical Grounds o f Rationality,(Oxford, 1986) pp. 411-39. See infra pp.00.
3Ibid. pp.414-16.
4 For his own qualifications see, e.g., p.414, note 11, note 24 and pp.424-29. The incorporation of form-copies as 
the things that particulars Have will necessitate some emendations to the logic.
5See the exchange between Gail Fine, 'Separation* (Hereafter SEP) and Donald Morrison, 'Separation in Aristotle's 
Metaphysics,* Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 1984 and 85, respectively, their replies, 1985, and G. Vlastos, 
'Separation' in Plato', same journal, 1987.
6See, for instance. Fine’s thorough discussion of the varieties of separation, SEP, 31-45. Compare D.M. Armstrong, 
Nominalism and Realism, (Cambridge, 1978) pp. 64-76.
7See Fine, SEP, pp.45ff. for this account and further references.
8On this line of reasoning, the dispute between Plato and his most famous student boils down to whether being a 
substance, an ousia, enteis that that entity is a particular. Aristotle says yes, Plato says no.
9On this line of reasoning, the dispute between Plato and his most famous student boils down to whether being a 
substance, an ousia, entails that that entity is a particular. Aristotle says yes, Plato says no.
10Cf. Code, p.46. 
n Cf. Fine, SEP, p.35.
12Code would reply, I think, that the linguistic predicability of the definition is sufficient to show that the essence is 
ontologically I-predicable of the item defined, but it does not follow from the fact that some particular Has 
(ontologically) an essence that the linguistic definition is predicable of the (name of the) particular. The definition is 
viewed as only I-predicable. Hence the definitional separation of Forms is preserved because the 1-definition is 
predicable only of the Form. Note that the problem generated by the identity of Form and essence is not restricted to 
Forms of natural kinds: Whiteness is identical with its essence. Since Socrates Has whiteness, he should also Have 
the essence of Whiteness and hence the definition of Whiteness should be 1-predicable of Socrates. But it is not, 
which gives Code reason to argue that H-predicability is independent from definitional separation. While this is a 
plausible account of Aristotle's position, it is difficult to see why Plato would be moved to adopt it. Lacking the 
notion of 'paronomy' and the attendant machinery of the Categories, it would mean that Plato is moved to separate 
Forms because a linguistic predicate can not be properly attached to a subject-term, even though the property 
introduced by the predicate does belong to the referent of the subject-term. Since I believe that the linguistic 
predicability of a predicate is explained by the metaphysical facts, I discount the option offered by Code. See F. 
Lewis, 'Plato's Third Man Argument and the "Platonism" of Aristotle,' in J. Bogen and J.E. McGuire, How Things 
Are, (Dordecht, 1983), pp.000.
13The causal efficacy of the property seems to require that whatever aspect of the property is immanent should be 
responsible for causing the appropriate effects in the physical world.
14If Time permitted, I would here introduce the second hypothesis of the Parmenides into the discussion. What we 
make of the claim that while Unity and Being are never found apart nonetheless we can grasp each by itself in 
thought, (143a6-9) is liable to have profound consequences for any account of separation of Forms from one another, 
and for my account of the possibility of (I-)predicating essences of both Forms and form-copies.
15GRyle, 'Plato's Parmenides'.originally printed in Mind, 1939, reprinted in Collected Papers Vol. I, (London,
1971) plO (pagination from reprint). Ryle then adds that this is not Bradley's regress 'found in the necessity of there 
always existing a further relation to relate any relation to its terms.’ See also Armstrong, I, pp. 70-71. See Gail 
Fine,'Armstrong On Relational and Nonrelational Realism', Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 62 (1981), pp.262-71, 
for a lucid discussion of problems with Armstrong's account of relational realisms.
16So Cook-Wilson argued in Statement and Inference 2.vols., (Oxford, 1926) p.398.
17See, for instance, Armstrong, p.70-71: 'I t appears, then, that the Relation regress holds against all relational 
analyses of what it is for an object to have a property or relation.’ (underlined phrase is my emphasis)
18For instance, in both cases English speakers use the expression 'is', although the two cases represent different 
kinds of predication or different relations.
19I blush to confess that I am relying on my notes here for my portrayal of Frede's account in Praedikation und 
Existenzaussage. My university library has been so far unable to find its copy or acquire one through inter-library 
loan.
20 G. Vlastos, 'The Third Man Argument in the Parmenides,' Philosophical Review 63 (1954), pp.319-49.
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21 Another option is to allow all forms to self-predicate. Another traditional interpretation of this passage is that what 
is being marked off is two kinds of predicates, namely complete predicates and incomplete ones. Complete predicates 
are those that can be the predicate in a statement of the form 'a is b ' and yield a sense such that the statement can be 
understood as is. Incomplete are those predicates which yield statements that cannot be so understood, because they 
must be added on to in some sense.This approach is neutral with respect to the predication relation utilized in these 
statements. On the other hand, it is silent about the notion of predicate being used here and the eligible substituenda 
for the name-variable 'a '. Can the predicates 'large* or 'equal* or 'good', three admittedly incomplete predicates, be 
subjects in sentences of the form 'Good Itself is...* ? Since there are Forms correlated with these predicates they can 
occur as subjects. But if they can occur as subjects, then what are we to say about sentences where the predicate 
appears on both sides of the 'is*? Is it used there incompletely or not? Here too then we might find appeal made to 
different senses of the copula, depending upon how these different kinds of predicates are being used, assuming that 
they are different kinds of predicates.
22For Plato, if some property-like entity turns out not to be definable, then it lacks an essence-and, hence, cannot be 
said to be aka--, and it fails to exist in any way that he would have us understand the Greek expressions equivalent to 
this use of 'exist'. Such is Plato's problematic of 'being', not our problematic of 'existence'.
^Here, again, the pattern of inferences in the second hypothesis of the Parmenides needs to be considered: starting 
from a one-being, Parmenides/Plato 'generates' Difference through consideration of our conceptual abilities to at once 
isolate and consider in tandem Unity and Being.
^Alexander Nehamas, 'Participation and Predication in Plato's Later Thought,' Review of Metaphysics 36 (1982), 
343-74.
^This would be consonant with Nehamas' reading. It is suggested by the argument at 256dl l-257a6.
26Recall that Ising or Ι-predication links an essence to a subject Note also that nothing precludes a subject from 
necessarily Having or being characterized by some property. Necessity is neutral with respect to the predication 
relations.
27 The completed reconstruction of a hierarchy will begin from the genus and descend to the ínfima species. 
^Scholars are split over this issue.Code, pp.426-9, allows that a Form Has the elements of its definiendum. 
Meinwald, Plato's Parmenides, (Oxford, 1989) (following Frede?), I think, would claim that the elements of the 
definition are essentially or I-predicated (my phrasing) of the definiendum. Moravscik's intensional mereology also 
should be read as having ontological force, 'Plato's Method of Division,' in Patterns in Plato's Thought, (Dordecht, 
1973) p.166.
29See, for instance, M. McPherran, 'Plato's Particulars,’ Southern Journal o f Philosophy 26 (1988),527-553;Perhaps 
also G. Fine, 'Relational Entities,’ Archive fur Geschichte der Philosophie 65 (1983), pp.225-249. (Hereafter RE)
See infra pages 000.
30Being constituted' has the advantage of not having a counterpart in Plato's Greek, but it is problematic 
nonetheless. First, it is not just all receiving, but shapeless and invisible, so it would seem to be equally constituted 
by these properties. Second, it does receive the whole gamut of form-copies and throughout itself, so there are 
reasons to think it is related to these properties (too) via constitution. Cf. McPherran, art.cit.
3 ^ Following Fine, RE p.229, especially note 8.
32RE
33G.B. Matthews and S. Marc Cohen, 'The One and The Many,’Review o f Metaphysics 21 (1968)pp. 631-55.
34Fine also appeals to the relation 'being a copy of with reference to a picture of Reagan. Since this example 
introduces many additional concerns, e.g., the image analogy in Plato, the nature of representations, I cannot go into 
the details of this example.
33I concede that some philosophers have thought that an object can come into being simultaneously with or in 
virtue of some relation. I have difficulty understanding how this can be. Cf. The objection of John Boler discussed 
in RE, p.236 note 23.
36I omit from the discussion the nature and role of souls.
37In order to generate particulars we would somehow have to 'divide' the receptacle. See below pages....
38Fine, RE, p.239.
39M.L. Gill, 'Matter and Flux in Plato's Timaeus,' Phronesis 32 (1981), pp.34-53.
40D. Zeyl, 'Plato and Talk of a World in Flux,' Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 79 (1975), pp. 125-48.
41H. Chemiss, Ά  Much Misread Passage of the Timaèus,’ American Journal o f Philology 88 (1954), pp. 113-30.
See my 'Timaean Particulars', Classical Quarterly, forthcoming, May 1992 
4253d4-54a6. See also the initial account of the construction at 31-2.
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43Forms included among the 'e t cetera' are Forms of all the traditional elements. Forms of all the kinds of things 
'constructed' from these elements, e.g., metals and liquids, and Forms of more complex entities such as Man and 
Horse,
^Such a Pythagorized Plato would be congenial to many. Robert Turnbull hais advocated this approach in my 
presence continuously over die years.
45Cf. M. Frede, 'Being and Becoming in Plato,' Ο φ τά  Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Supplementary Volume, 
1988, pp.36-52; R. Patterson./mage and Reality in Plato'sMetaphysics, (Indianapolis, 1985); and T. Penner, The 
Ascent From Nominalism, (Dordecht, 1987),
